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Three linked risks for development in the Pacific Islands:   
Climate Change, Disasters and Conflict 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Pacific Island countries are demonstrably vulnerable to the risks of climate change , 
disasters and conflict.  This paper outlines the conceptual links between these risks,  
briefly describes how each of the risks operates in  the Pacific Islands , and goes on to 
demonstrate the interaction of climate change, disasters and potential for conflict in 
the Pacific Islands, by applying a new conceptual framework to some  illustrative case 
studies.  
 
The case studies include relocation after the Gizo earthquake, ‘environmental 
refugees’ from sea level rise, aggravation of the social issues of urbanisation and 
unemployed youth by climate change.  Fortunately, none of these cases has yet 
crossed the threshold into violent conflict, even though relocation of an affected 
community onto someone else’s land is a particularly sensitive issue in the Pacific 
Islands.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Climate change, natural hazards and conflict are all risks that threaten to impede 
social and economic development, wherever they occur, but especially in developing 
countries, which often lack the economic and human resources to recover quickly 
from the problems when they occur.    
This paper focuses on the interaction between these three risks to development, first 
in general terms and then in the particular context of the Pacific Islands.   Some of the 
small island states of the Pacific have suffered from conflict in the last couple of 
decades, and all of them are among the countries acknowledged as most vulnerable to 
climate change and the associated natural hazards.  The case studies in this  paper 
suggest  that climate change is likely to raise the level of stress in Pacific 
communities, particularly in relation to land rights,  which are a notorious root of 
conflict in the Pacific Islands.  However , like Barnett ( 2009),  we conclude climate 
change is unlikely to be a primary cause of conflict in the Pacific, at least for the next 
few years.  However, further research on other case studies  may be warranted, 
especially in relation to the longer term (say, 30-50 years) in which  impacts of 
climate change become more severe,  not least as the very survival of low-lying atoll 
states may be at stake.    
Before focusing on their  interaction, we very  briefly consider the risks to 
development generally posed by the three risks separately (Section 2) . Section 3 then 
presents a conceptual diagram  which summarises the links and interaction between 
the three risks. Section 4 outlines the context of the  Pacific Islands, including more 
specific detail about the three risks as they apply in that region.   Section 5 introduces 
a new conceptual framework for examining how climate change and associated 
disasters  can lead to conflict, and applies the framework to  several case studies in the 
Pacific Islands.   
2. THREE SEPARATE RISKS TO DEVELOPMENT 
Disasters.  In a small developing  country, the economic cost of a major disaster, such 
as the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 or  the hurricane in  Grenada in 2004,   can 
approach or even exceed the GDP of the country concerned (Cavallo et al., 2010; 
IPCC, 2007a).     And the computed economic cost may not include the full  social 
cost of  loss of life, livelihood,  shelter, and food usually associated with such 
disasters (IFRC, 2002; McKenzie et al., 2005) .   Policy makers, scientists, and 
development workers around the world have become increasingly aware of the 
implications of poor disaster management and response planning, and the  cost-
effectiveness of improving these before the next disaster strikes (Bettencourt et al., 
2006) (World Bank, 2010). 
Climate change.  The UN Human Development Report for 2007/8 asserts that “failure 
to respond to the challenge [of climate change] will stall and then reverse 
international efforts to reduce poverty”  (UNDP, 2008). The Fourth Assessment 
Report of the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) offers the most 
definitive assessment to date on the causes, trends and projected impacts of climate 
change. The report indicates that climate change cannot easily be disentangled from 
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other factors which erode development gains and cause upheaval among human 
populations: “Vulnerable regions face multiple stresses that affect their exposure and 
sensitivity as well as their capacity to adapt, these stresses arise from, for example, 
current climate hazards, poverty and unequal access to resources, food insecurity, 
trends in economic globalization, conflict and incidence of diseases.” (IPCC, 2007a).  
Economic models (reviewed by Metz et al (2007) and by Stern(2006) ) suggest that 
even for a 2 to 3 degree rise in global mean temperature the cost in lost livelihood 
would be between 1 and 3 per cent of global GDP, but with the higher costs incurred 
by developing countries.   Such a rise  now looks to be almost certain, given the lack 
of progress with global mitigation efforts.  Stern (2006) estimates that the probability 
of an average temperature increase of 5 or 6 deg C to be a non-negligible 5% and that 
such a large climate change would incur a loss of 5 to 10% of global GDP, with the 
percentage much higher in the poorer and more vulnerable countries.  
 
 
Conflict . Collier (2007) collects strong evidence to show that conflict, particularly in 
the form of long-running civil war, can prevent a country from developing 
economically or even socially – trapping a country in poverty.  We argue here that 
less dramatic and more frequent forms of conflict, such as widespread crime or strong 
mistrust between different parts of society are also a risk to development, though on a 
lesser scale.  In discussing  these less overt forms of conflict, in this paper we talk 
instead in terms of  related concepts, notably ‘potential conflict’,  ‘security’ or ‘human 
security’ (see below).  
 
 
 
3.   GENERAL  INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE, 
DISASTERS  AND THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT   
 
The  three risks of disasters, climate change and conflict interact with each other in 
numerous ways, which we summarise in the triangle shown in Figure 1.  In this 
section, we discuss these interactions in general  terms, with examples from the 
Pacific Islands discussed in more detail in section 5.  
 
There have been very few previous studies that explicitly examine the linkages of all 
three sides of the triangle: climate  change, disaster events and conflict. [1] .  The only 
one known to us is the Global Environment Change and Human Security Project 
report for the Norwegian Government, which focuses on the implications for 
developing countries (O'Brien et al., 2008). This report contains a huge bibliography 
of academic papers, books and agency reports bearing on each side  of the triangle 
shown in Figure 1.   
 
Climate change and disasters.   
 
Climate change is projected to make some natural hazards more severe, notably 
cyclones, floods and droughts.  Conversely, other natural hazards, notably large 
volcanic eruptions, by putting large amounts of greenhouse gases and aerosol particles 
into the atmosphere can dramatically affect the climate globally in both the short and 
long term. (For example, witness the “years without a summer” following the 
eruptions of Mt Pinatubo in 1991  and Krakatau in 1883).   (IPCC, 2007b) 
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We caution that although the conceptual link between disaster risk reduction and 
climate change adaptation is now widely recognised, the vocabulary,  practitioners, 
and responsible institutions are often still separate, though some convergence is 
beginning to occur  (Schipper, 2009).   
 
Disasters and conflict  
 
The UNDP’s ‘Reducing Disaster Risk’ report (Bureau for Crisis Prevention and 
Recovery, 2004) analyses the factors that could cause ‘complex emergencies’.  For 
example,  conflict, especially civil war, can make it very difficult to mobilise recovery 
from a disaster, as government falls apart and/or bars outside access to the affected 
region.  Conversely major disasters of all kinds force people to relocate away from the 
affected area, for either a short time (s/t) or for the long term (l/t) . Large-scale 
migrations throughout history have often involved conflict between the migrants and 
those to whose land they go.  
 
Climate change and conflict 
 
Conflict can contribute to human-induced climate change in various ways.  For 
example,  attempts to deprive an enemy of  shelter or food (‘scorched earth’) by 
destroying forests or crops can increase greenhouse gas emissions.  Increased military 
activity often implies large-scale fuel use, as warships, aircraft and tanks are 
deployed. The destruction of oil reserves by fire, such as in Kuwait in 1994, can give 
a spike in greenhouse gas emissions.   
 
Leading a discussion in the UN Security Council in 2007 on the implications  of 
climate change for international security,  the UK Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett 
pointed to three significant impacts (Reuters, 2007): 
 Unprecedented levels of migration – especially from poor to rich countries - as 
a result of flooding, disease and famine 
 Intensified competition for food, water and energy 
 Large-scale global economic disruption.  
This discussion was followed by a resolution by the UN General Assembly  that calls 
attention to the threat of climate change to international peace and security (UNGA, 
2009). That resolution was driven by concerns of Pacific Island countries and other 
small island developing states that too many industrialised states are not taking 
climate change seriously enough to prevent drastic impacts on the islands. It aimed to  
put climate change into an agenda that developed countries – even the recalcitrant 
USA – take more seriously, namely international peace and security.  
 
Some think tanks which normally focus on international security or the ‘war on terror’  
have taken up this theme, and have expressed alarm about the security implications of 
climate change (Campbell et al., 2007; Jasparro and Taylor, 2008; Soderblom, 2008). 
Dyer (2008) gives graphic presentations of such scenarios for major conflicts arising 
from the impacts of climate change on the Indian subcontinent, China, and central 
America.    
 
A  more measured report by Smith and Vivekanda (2007) for International Alert (an 
independent peace-building organization with field offices across the developing 
  Revised version – DR11- 110724-    p.6 
 
world) looked at social and human consequences of climate change, specifically 
exploring the risks of conflict and instability –  which they memorably label as  the 
‘consequences of consequences’. That paper highlights four key elements of risk: 
political instability, economic weakness, food insecurity, and large scale migration. 
Like the many other analyses summarised by O’Brien et al  (2008 chapter 5) they 
expect such migration to be forced less by short-term disasters (such as floods) than 
by the more gradual but equally insidious impacts of climate change such as sea level 
rise, coastal erosion and long-term drought.  The possibility of  forced migration due 
to sea level rise is a major issue for the Pacific Islands, and is considered in more 
detail in Section 5.   
In their overall assessment of the literature to date,  O’Brien et al (2008) conclude 
“the evidence about the links between environmental change and violent conflict is 
currently inconclusive…There is, however, ample evidence that human insecurities 
associated with a lack of basic needs such as food, water, and shelter, limit 
capabilities and freedoms, and thus have negative implications for human 
development”.  Taking this into account, much of the more recent literature 
(e.g.Brauch et al., 2009), discusses  climate change less in the context of state security 
(which refers to the defence of borders) but more in  the wider context of ‘human 
security’ (which refers to the protection of individuals).  Human security  includes not 
only  political security (freedom from war) and personal security (freedom from 
physical violence) but also economic security, food security, health security, 
environmental security, and community[cultural] security (UNDP, 1994).  
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4. PACIFIC ISLANDS CONTEXT 
 
We summarise here the recent impacts in the Pacific Islands of each of climate 
change, natural hazards and conflict before examining the linkages between them. 
 
Each Pacific Island Country (PIC) has given different emphasis to each risk, 
depending on its circumstances and history.  Thus, in the atoll state of Kiribati, 
climate change and sea level rise is seen as the key issue for national survival and 
receives high political attention, with President Tong personally convening the 
multinational Tarawa Climate Conference in October 2010 and taking an active 
personal role in the treaty negotiations at Copenhagen (2009) and Cancun (2010). 
(See the website www.climate.gov.ki) .  Solomon Islands, on the other hand, lies on 
the geothermal ‘ring of fire’ and is prone to a wide range of natural hazards of which 
climate change is only one.  It is also still recovering from a violent period of civil 
unrest (1998-2002), which ended only with the RAMSI  peacekeeping intervention by 
its regional neighbours (Dinnen, 2008).   In Papua New Guinea (PNG), there are even 
greater concerns about conflict and human security.  In Port Moresby (the capital of 
PNG) about 50% of households experience some form of armed violence each year 
(Small Arms Survey, 2005), while inter-tribal conflicts in the PNG highlands cause 
hundreds of deaths each year (Haley and May, 2007).  
 
 
The map in Figure 2 indicates locations. Note that the PICs are all small in land area 
and population (except for Papua New Guinea), though all have an extensive marine 
Exclusive Economic Zone; in most cases the label on the map is far bigger than the 
island(s) to which it refers!   PNG has a land area of 462,000 km2  and a population of 
nearly 6 million.  Each of  the others has population of less than 1 million and land 
area of  less than 19,000 km2.  Kiribati,  for example,  has a land area of only 810 km2 
though it spans some 2000 km of ocean!  [2]  All except the French territories of New 
Caledonia and French Polynesia are classified by the UN as developing countries. [3]   
 
Conflict 
 
Large scale protracted violent conflict in the Pacific Islands, unlike in some other 
regions, is mercifully rare. However, in recent decades some Pacific Island countries 
have experienced a variety of localised conflict including civil war, tribal conflict, 
inter-communal violence, political instability, social unrest and in some instances a 
deterioration of law and order.  A good starting point into the extensive literature on 
conflict in the Pacific  is the website of the State Society and Governance Project at 
the Australian National University , available through www.anu.edu.au . See 
especially the paper by  Spence and  Wielders (2006)  That project  website is 
complemented by that of the  more recent Peacebuilding Compared  Project , also 
available through www.anu.edu.au .  Also useful is the  wide ranging proceedings  of 
the Canterbury conference (Henderson and Watson, 2005).   
 
In his introductory chapter to that volume, Henderson lists six examples of armed 
conflicts in the Pacific Islands region since 1980: the ongoing independence struggle 
in West Papua (the western half of the island of New Guinea) with over 100,000 
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deaths, ongoing  tribal fighting in the PNG highlands (several hundred deaths each 
year),  the independence struggle in New Caledonia in the 1980s (over 50 deaths), 
civil war in the Bougainville region of  Papua New Guinea in the 1990s  with over 
10,000 deaths (Braithwaite et al., 2010a, chapter 7), and inter-communal violence in 
Solomon Islands 1999-2002 with about  200 deaths (Dinnen, 2008).  The damage and 
loss of lives during these conflicts may be small by global standards but have a 
tremendous impact on the stability and development of these small islands, not only 
because of the deaths but also because of the displacement of tens of thousands of 
people by threats, abductions and destruction of property (especially in Bougainville 
and Solomon Islands).  
 
Henderson  (2005) also gives a long list of violent ‘political’  events since 1975 
involving fewer deaths, including assassinations in Palau, Samoa and New Caledonia, 
military and civilian coups in Fiji  (Lal et al., 2008), and various riots in Vanuatu and 
French Polynesia.  The later riotous protests in 2006 against unresponsive politicians 
in Tonga  could now be added to his list (Campbell, 2008; Harman, 2008).   
   
Conflict and threats to stability in the Pacific, as in other regions, is rarely caused by a 
single factor. There are usually long standing underlying causes of conflict, or threats 
to stability which remain embedded in society which erupt into violence due to certain 
triggering factors (such as disasters or elections, for example).   Such triggers are 
often linked to the manipulation of ‘identity’ by so-called ‘conflict entrepreneurs’ 
who benefit from instability. As Steven Ratuva (2002) puts it in relation to the Fiji 
coups, “differences in identity [e.g. in terms of  ethnicity] do not necessarily cause 
political conflict, but the way in which these differences are deployed to justify 
particular demands and interests may do so.” 
 
Building on Carleton University’s long established framework of ‘country indicators 
for foreign policy’ (Anderson, 2004) , ANU’s current Peacebuilding Project is 
examining many conflict situations in the region in terms of their ‘structural factors, 
proximate factors, key triggering incidents, key war-making actors, key peace-making 
actors’, etc (Braithwaite et al., 2010b, chapter 1). However events can act as a trigger 
for conflict, only if there are sufficient threats to stability that interact with one 
another to create a high level of instability and division in the society.  Unless these 
underlying threats to stability are addressed in the long term, the country may be at 
risk of violent expressions of conflict on an ongoing basis, at the onset of new and 
ongoing trigger events.   
 
The Biketawa Declaration adopted by Pacific Leaders at their Forum in 2000 
specifically identifies as  difficult and sensitive issues underlying causes of tensions 
and conflict in the region: ethnic tensions, socio-economic disparities, lack of good 
governance, land disputes and erosion of cultural values’ (Pacific Islands Forum, 
2000).   Follow-up work  by the Forum Secretariat and UNDP, aiming to develop a 
Pacific Islands Framework for Human Security and Conflict Prevention has 
elaborated slightly on these ‘causes  of tension’, to  produce a list of factors that are 
present across the region and present an increasing threat to stability if not addressed. 
In this paper, we refer to these as human security factors.   They are:   
 
 
 Economic inequality 
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 Land issues 
 Weak governance capacity 
 Unemployment and alienated youth 
 Migration 
 Urbanization 
 Inter-group tensions  
 
It is important to recognise that several of these factors are interrelated. For example, 
perceptions of economic inequality drive urbanisation, which may lead to a build-up 
of youth who are unemployed and alienated if the hoped-for economic opportunities 
are not forthcoming.   
 
Many of the states that have avoided extensive violent conflict in recent times are in 
Polynesia, where the traditional governance systems are still operating in parallel with 
or underlying the modern governance systems and operate up to a national level, thus 
providing a mechanism for intra-state dispute resolution. Also these states have much 
tighter gun controls than has been the case in Papua New Guinea and Solomon 
Islands, where the ready availability of guns has led to a sharp increase in mortality 
from inter-tribal conflicts (Haley and May, 2007). Indeed, in those states where there 
are significant armed forces, their record suggests that militaries and para-militaries 
have tended to generate instability rather than stability (Crocombe, 2008; Henderson, 
2005).   
 
Natural hazards 
 
Pacific Island Countries are amongst the most vulnerable countries  in the world to 
disasters arising from natural hazards, in part because their economies and small 
communities are highly dependent on natural resources. The World Bank reports  that 
since 1950 disasters have affected more than 3.4 million people in total and caused 
more than 1,700 fatalities in the Pacific region. (Bettencourt et al., 2006) This 
represents a significant fraction of the region’s population  of less than 8 million; over 
40 percent of the population of Tonga and Samoa is affected during a typical disaster 
year.    For comparison, OCHA (2009) estimate that over 20 million people out of a 
global population of over 6 billion were displaced in 2008 by sudden-onset climate-
related disasters.  That  World Bank report estimated the economic cost of  reported 
disasters in the Pacific Islands region in the 1990s at  US$2.8 billion (2004 value).  
This represents a very significant fraction of the GDP of these small island states.  For 
example, during disaster years, the economic losses have averaged 46 percent of GDP 
in Samoa, 30% in Vanuatu and 14% in Tonga. As the damage effects normally extend 
beyond the year of the disaster, so too do the consequent economic losses, which 
amount  to 2–7 percent of GDP, averaged over  both disaster and non-disaster years. 
(Bettencourt et al., 2006) 
 
The most prevalent natural hazards in the region as a whole are  cyclones, droughts 
and tsunamis, but not all Pacific Island countries are equally vulnerable to each of 
these hazards.  There has been a substantial increase in the number of reported 
disasters in the region since the 1950s, with a growing human impact per event. While 
this may be due to improved reporting, higher populations and increasing 
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environmental degradation, there is no doubt that disasters in the region are becoming 
more intense and probably more frequent (Bettencourt et al., 2006).  
 
Much work has been undertaken in terms of disaster management and risk reduction 
at both national and regional levels.  Nevertheless, we consider that it is still true that 
the vulnerability of PICs is exacerbated by socio-political factors identified by 
Bettencourt et al (2006) including: risk management not adequately mainstreamed 
into national planning and budgetary processes; limited capacity within government 
and civil society; lack of awareness on the link between development practice and 
vulnerability disasters; weak institutional frameworks for implementing measures for 
Disaster Risk Management .  Similar socio-political considerations apply to the 
vulnerability to climate change and to adaptation to that risk (Nunn, 2009).   
 
Impacts of climate change 
High exposure to climate risks and limited adaptive capacity make Pacific Island 
Countries particularly vulnerable to climate change and sea-level rise. The impacts 
projected by the authoritative Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 
2007a) include:  
 Deterioration in coastal conditions, for example through erosion of beaches and coral 
bleaching, is expected to affect local resources, e.g., fisheries, and reduce the value of 
these destinations for tourism.  
 Sea-level rise is expected to exacerbate inundation, storm surge, erosion and other 
coastal hazards, thus threatening vital infrastructure, settlements and facilities that 
support the livelihood of island communities.  
 Climate change is projected by the mid-century to reduce water resources in many 
small islands, e.g., in the Caribbean and Pacific, to the point where they become 
insufficient to meet demand during low rainfall periods.  
 
The impacts of sea level rise are already apparent in  the low-lying atolls, which 
comprise most of Kiribati, Tuvalu and Marshall Islands, with many islands now being 
inundated almost annually by the highest tide of the year. With sea levels projected to 
rise by at least 100cm by 2100, the very survival of these countries is threatened (see 
Box 2).    
 
IPCC  (2007b) projections imply  lower rainfall, more frequent droughts, and less 
frequent cyclones  west of  Fiji,  with  higher rainfall and more frequent cyclones east 
of Fiji.  More generally about cyclones world-wide, IPCC project increased peak wind 
intensities and increased mean and peak precipitation intensities in future tropical 
cyclones, with the possibility of a decrease in the number of relatively weak cyclones, 
and increased numbers of intense cyclones (also known as typhoons or hurricanes) .  
 
The recent book by Barnett and Campbell (2009) highlights the importance of 
considering climate change impacts in the Pacific from a socio-political perspective 
and not just as a topic for scientific modelling.  This perspective focuses on issues 
such as forced migration, displacement and dislocation resulting from climate change 
and disasters, and the subsequent ramifications on social structures and coping 
capacities.   
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5. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE , DISASTERS AND  
CONFLICT IN THE PACIFIC 
 
 
The link from climate change and disaster events  to potential for conflict   
 
In Section 4 of this paper we have found that: 
 
 Potential for conflict occurs in a  Pacific Island country when one or more of 
the following human security factors are present:  economic inequalities; land 
issues; weak governance capacity; unemployed and alienated youth; 
migration/urbanisation; and inter-group tensions. 
 Conflict requires a triggering event. 
 Climate change is expected to increase the severity of natural hazards in the 
region, especially tropical cyclones, which make up the most widespread 
disaster events in the region.  
 
To these we now add the following linkages:    
 A sudden-onset disaster [4] can be a triggering event for conflict. 
 Longer-term (slow-onset) climate change can also trigger conflict by 
aggravating existing environmental and societal stresses, notably stresses on 
water supply and   food security.    
 
These linkages are indicated in Figure 3, which in effect elaborates on the arrows in 
Figure 1 pointing towards [potential] conflict.  Figure 3 provides a new conceptual 
framework for examining how climate change and associated disasters can lead to 
conflict.  In each case, a  disaster event or manifestation of climate change triggers a 
‘physical’ consequence, which in turn aggravates one or more of the human security 
factors which underpin conflict in the Pacific.  If this human security factor is already 
near its breaking point, then the trigger of the disaster or climate change impact can be 
enough to take an already tense situation over the threshold into overt conflict.    
 
By way of example, Table 1 summarises some cases  in which  land rights and other 
human security factors have been, or can be  expected to be,  aggravated by climate 
change and other natural hazards. In the following text we draw out these linkages 
more explicitly through the  case studies listed in the table. These case studies are 
based on published papers, supplemented by interviews we conducted in Solomon 
Islands, Kiribati, Fiji,  and Papua New Guinea.    
 
 
Relocation after a disaster - on whose land?  
Disputes over land are one of the major causes of tension and conflict in the Pacific 
Islands.  For this reason, the Forum Secretariat commissioned a series of studies 
focussed specifically on Land Management and Conflict Minimisation, of which 
McIntyre (2009) is the most directly relevant to this paper.   
 
Crocombe (2008  chapter 11) eloquently describes land rights in the Pacific Islands 
and their implications.  In most  PICs, most of the land is still under customary land 
ownership, either communal or individual  The communal land-owning group is 
typically a village or clan unit.  Land, which usually allows a reasonably healthy level 
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of subsistence farming,  constitutes not only the main economic asset for many 
people, but also a manifestation of the  identity of the community to which they 
belong.   Land-owners often require considerable persuasion to allow ‘their’ land to 
be used for any other purpose (Bennett, 2002).  As a further complication, in many 
PICs, there are often disputes about exactly who are the land-owners, especially if the 
land suddenly becomes valuable to outsiders, e.g. because mineral resources are found 
under it.   Most of the alienated land (i.e. land held under western-style law) is around 
the urban centres, where it was acquired in colonial times by colonists and / or the 
government.   
 
The top row of Table 1 summarises how a disaster of some kind can impact on the 
human security factor of land:  a common consequence of a disaster is that people 
have to be relocated away from the affected area for a short or long time (depending 
on the nature of the disaster).   For example, following the 2007 earthquake and 
associated tsunami in the Solomon Islands people in the worst affected areas were 
relocated to ‘temporary’ settlements inshore. They have now been there for over 2 
years, which gives rise to tensions with the people onto whose land they have been 
relocated.  (Ironically, most of these displaced are descendants of people who were 
moved by the British colonial government from some atolls in what is now Kiribati, 
when those islands became uninhabitable due to salt intrusion in the 1950s, (Lieber, 
1977).)  Numerous Solomon Islanders consider that the relief effort (and funds 
donated for it)have been politically mismanaged. This  invokes another human 
security factor likely to lead to conflict (though it has not done so in this case): weak 
governance.  Moreover there are perceptions of economic inequality arising from the 
way in which some villages have been favoured by the relief effort – with new 
buildings stronger than those destroyed -  while  others have got nothing as yet.  Had 
this disaster occurred during the conflict of 1999-2002, when there was no functional 
central government, the response would almost certainly have been even less effective 
– it would have been an example of the reverse arrow of Figure 1,  ‘inability to 
respond to disasters’.   
 
This story contrasts with the aftermath of the most recent eruption of the volcano(s) 
around the town of Rabaul in Papua New Guinea (in 1994) which smothered most of 
the town in ash.  Several thousand people have been permanently relocated to other 
parts of the Gazelle Peninsula.  The relative success of this relocation is partly due to 
the funds and special administration set up to deal with it, but also because of  the 
recognition implicitly given  to conflict avoidance by putting most of the resettlement 
on ‘plantation’ land that was alienated a century or so ago. This greatly weakened any 
claims  by  native ‘land-owners’  for compensation (by force or otherwise) for the 
intrusion.  (A Regan,  personal communication). 
 
The remaining entry in the second row of Table 1 refers to a village on the island of 
Savaii in Samoa that was buried by a lava flow in 1908. The whole village was 
relocated, with assistance from the Catholic Church, to an unoccupied site on the 
island of Upolu, and recently celebrated the centenary of this event (Samoa Times, 
2008).  Two probable reasons why that story turned out happily (no conflict) are that  
(i) inter-group tensions were low in the homogeneous society of Samoa, and (ii) 
unoccupied land was easier to find in 1908 than it would be now that the population 
of the country is much higher.  
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Although the most common type of natural hazard in the Pacific is tropical cyclones, 
only rarely have these been severe enough to require relocation from the affected area. 
All Pacific societies had traditional coping mechanisms, usually involving holding 
back certain long-lasting foodstuffs until they were needed, i.e. the interval between  
when the usual crops were destroyed and when a fresh crop could be planted and 
come to fruition.  
 
Forced migration (relocation) 
The UN High Commission for Refugees deals only with those who are displaced by 
war or persecution  In 2008 , there were no fewer than 42 million such people, of 
which 26 million were internally displaced people uprooted within their own 
countries  (UNHCR, 2009) .  People displaced for other reasons are not yet legally 
recognised as ‘refugees’, but there is increasing international discussion of such cases, 
exemplified by the electronic journal Forced Migration Review, published 
continuously since 1987.  In particular, the  issue of ‘environmental refugees’ driven 
by climate change is being discussed (Couldrey and Herson, 2008) [5] . The number of 
people potentially affected world-wide is controversial, but may well be as many as 
the number of those fleeing conflict (O'Brien et al., 2008).  
 
In the Pacific Islands, a literature survey by Campbell, Goldsmith and Koshy (2005) 
found 86 reported cases of forced relocation between 1920 and 2005. Of these 
relocations,  just under half (37 cases out of 86) were driven by natural hazards and 
disasters. (These authors usefully distinguish between ‘relocations’ of whole 
communities,  ‘evacuations’ in which the community returns to its  original location 
after temporarily fleeing some disaster, and ‘migration’ of individuals, even when 
others from the same community follow over time by a process of chain migration).  
Most of the other relocations were driven by armed conflict or  major projects such as 
mines, new airports,  or nuclear testing.  Many of these displacements involve people 
moving within a country, which in Pacific Island countries often means from one 
island to another.   
 
 ‘Environmental refugees’  from sea level rise 
 
Climate change is projected to make tropical cyclones more severe, and perhaps also 
more frequent. (IPCC, 2007b)  That dynamic is implied in the ‘sudden’ disaster 
linkage to conflict indicated by the left side of the triangle diagram (see Figure 1).  
 
But climate change can also give rise to conflict through the gradual and insidious 
effects represented by the right side of the triangle diagram (Figure 1), notably 
through sea level rise   and through persistent changes to rainfall and temperature 
patterns (e.g. longer dry spells and warmer seas).   
 
The 2007 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change projects that sea 
level may rise by 1m by the end of this century, thereby swamping many coral atolls, 
in which the highest point is less than 2m above mean sea level.  But an atoll will 
become uninhabitable long before it is totally submerged, because salt water incursion 
will pollute its fresh water supply, which is held underground, in a ‘lens’ floating on 
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top of the sea  level. Salt water incursion from below is aggravated by extra high tides 
(king tides) and storm surges, which bring in salt water from above as it washes over 
the land. This is already happening to many atolls in the Pacific, with the Carteret 
Islands of PNG being a well-publicised case (see Box 1), and is likely to happen by 
about 2040 for most of the others.   
 
Several  PICs consist almost entirely of atolls, notably Kiribati, Tuvalu and Marshall 
Islands.  All or most of the tens of thousands of inhabitants of these countries will 
probably have to migrate to other countries either legally or illegally by about 2040. 
These raises not only the internal human security factors of Table 1 but also the 
international security concerns flagged in section 2 of this paper (See Box 2).  
 
Some analysts regard such large-scale forced migration as an extreme adaptation to 
climate change (Nunn, 2009) while others argue it should be classified as an  impact 
on the small islands and compensated accordingly by the countries whose emissions 
caused the problem (Barnett and Campbell, 2010).  Some PIC governments tend to 
refrain from forcibly raising the issue in the international negotiations about the 
climate change treaties in order to maintain pressure to decrease global  GHG 
emissions. Other PICs, notably Kiribati,  squarely face the issue and try to lessen its 
impact on both the sending and receiving countries by seeking a much increased legal 
migration to nearby metropolitan countries, most likely through gradual labour 
migration as advocated by Barnett and Campbell (2010) (see Box 2).  
 
 
 
Box 1.  The Carteret Islands: the first environmental refugees?  
 
The Cartaret Islands form a  low-lying coral atoll in Papua New Guinea, about 100 km  north-
east of the large island of Bougainville.  Food security has been poor for decades because of 
the high population density and the  limited and relatively infertile land area of an atoll, even if 
fish are abundant . Consequently  governments at various levels have been attempting since 
the 1980s to relocate at least some of the population to Bougainville (Bourke and Betitis, 
2003).  However only a few families have ever actually been relocated, and many of these 
have moved back to their original islands over the years, in part for cultural reasons and (in 
the 1990s) because of  the insecurity on Bougainville alluded to in Section 4.  
 
The food security in the Carterets has been aggravated by salinisation from rising sea levels. 
Environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace have given much publicity to population 
movements since about 2000, not least through videos on YouTube, and through the 
islanders own website tulelepeisa.org ,  claiming that these people are the first ‘environmental 
refugees’ from human-induced sea level rise.  Some geologists dispute this interpretation, 
saying that the islands are sinking due to geological instabilities. But in human terms the 
effect is the same: people have to move because their current habitat is unsustainable .  
 
 
 
Box 2: Can a whole country relocate? The case of Kiribati 
 
Kiribati is comprised of 33 inhabited islands, all but one of which are low-lying coral atolls.  In 
a typical atoll, a lagoon of sea water is enclosed by a coral reef, some of which rises above 
sea level to form a narrow- low-lying strip of land (Nunn, 1994). [6]  
 
Because of salt water intrusion caused by sea level rise, Kiribati and other atoll countries may  
become largely uninhabitable by 2040 or thereabouts, as they will have no stock of fresh 
water to drink or to grow crops. In Kiribati this pressure will be particularly severe, because 
  Revised version – DR11- 110724-    p.15 
 
about 50,000 people (half the total population) now live in the ‘capital island’ of Tarawa, 
concentrated in the most habitable side of this relatively large atoll: a strip about 20 km long 
by 200 meters wide and no more than two meters high. Thus, on this island with little land 
available for crops and limited fresh water, food security and water supply are already under 
stress.  Climate change  and associated sea  level rise will worsen these human security 
issues.  
 
 For such countries, sea level rise is a matter of national survival, and consequently an issue 
of high political importance. Thus, the President of Kiribati, Mr. Anote Tong, has been vocal in 
international forums, not least the Conference of Parties of the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. He  points out that the industrialised world (which is responsible for the 
greenhouse gas emissions which are causing sea level rise) consequently has a moral 
obligation to facilitate the relocation of the people who will be displaced from Kiribati and 
similar countries.  He also seeks assistance to upgrade the skills of the people of Kiribati, so 
that they can better adapt to life in another country, even though much of their traditional 
culture will be lost (which can be seen as a related human rights issue) (Nadkarni, 2008) .  
  
 
Climate change will aggravate issues of  urbanisation and unemployed youth in 
the Pacific Islands 
 
The population of most Pacific Island countries is both very young (typically >50% 
under 15 years old) and rapidly increasing (e.g. 2% increase per year  in Kiribati, 
2.2% in PNG) (SPC, 2009).  There is also increasing urbanisation, much of it now 
driven by perceptions of better educational and consequently better economic 
opportunities in the urban centre.  Unfortunately, many of the young people who 
finish up in the towns of the Pacific are  unable to find the hoped-for economic 
opportunities but are reluctant to ‘return’ to the rural area or outer island from which 
they or their family have come, as they feel that to do so would lower their status by  
an admission of failure.  Instead they hang round the towns as a collective of 
unemployed or alienated youth.  This is rated as a potential conflict factor because it 
can lead to crime as a means for the youth to support themselves, and criminal gangs 
as a way to assert their identity, as has already happened dramatically in Papua New 
Guinea.  
 
Box 3 compares the youth situation in PNG with that in Kiribati, where violent 
conflict is very much rarer.  Solomon Islands and Fiji represent intermediate cases 
between these extremes.  
 
Climate change is likely to aggravate these human security factors, by decreasing 
food security in the rural areas or outer islands, thereby adding to the factors inducing 
migration to urban areas where imported food is more readily available.  Locke’s 
(2009) interviews in Kiribati suggest that this is already happening there.  
Alternatively, where people (usually older people) are reluctant to move for cultural 
reasons, climate change can lead to increased pressure on diminishing resources of 
food and/or fresh water.   
 
 
Box 3 . Urban youth in Kiribati and PNG 
 
In Kiribati for example, about 50,000 people (half the total population) now live in the ‘capital 
island’ of Tarawa. Because there is so little land there, population densities in parts of Tarawa 
are comparable to those in Hong Kong.   Since families on other islands often send a child to 
stay with a relative on Tarawa for secondary education, the population there has an even 
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greater proportion of youths than the country as a whole.  But in a country with a few 
resources (at least on land) there is little employment outside government and the 
government-owned service corporations (telecommunications, shipping etc) .  
 
Consequently of the 2000 young people who finish their schooling each year in Kiribati, only 
about 500 find paid employment within 12 months (Locke, 2009)  Nor can they simply go into 
farming or fishing (the traditional subsistence occupations) as  there is no land available for 
new gardens on crowded South Tarawa, and many do not have access to a boat for fishing 
(which is also under pressure there).    Fortunately, these underemployed youths on Tarawa 
have kept themselves occupied with sports and other social activities, and although there 
have clearly been family tensions, as yet few have turned to crime.  Community leaders  
interviewed in Kiribati  attribute this happy state to the strength of the extended family culture 
in Kiribati, although there are some signs that this is starting to weaken. For example, 
teenage pregnancy (an excess of social activity?) and prostitution (with visiting seamen) are 
quite significant.  Social workers from government and churches have fostered constructive 
activities for youth, but no one has yet come up with any long-term solutions.   
 
Given demographic trends over the coming decade, the youth problem is likely to get worse in 
Kiribati.  We think that this will probably entail a rise in petty crime, as youth seek resources to 
sustain their activities, though the culture will probably continue to restrain major crime.     
 
The problem of unemployed youth is far worse in Papua New Guinea than anywhere else in 
the Pacific, as many of the unemployed youth in the main town (Port Moresby) have formed 
into raskol gangs and turned to violent crime.  In Port Moresby (the capital of PNG) 50% of 
households have experienced some form of armed violence in the past six months (Small 
Arms Survey, 2005). In PNG, 85% of the population of 6 million still lives a basically 
subsistence life in rural areas, and the population of Port Moresby is less than 300,000.   
Thus the proportion of youth ‘hanging round’ the town is smaller than in several other PICs, 
but their involvement in conflict is far greater.   
   
 
 
 
   
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The conceptual framework summarised  in Figure 1 and Figure 3 of this paper is a 
fruitful way to analyse the way in which a particular manifestation of climate change 
or disaster can increase tension that is already present in a Pacific island.  Gradual 
climate change (and/or  associated sea level rise) or a disaster event ( a ‘triggering 
event’) leads to physical consequences, which in turn may aggravate one of the socio-
economic factors that underlie almost all conflict in the Pacific Islands. If so, this will 
raise tension in the community.  Most obviously this occurs when the ‘physical  
consequence’ involves relocation of an affected community onto someone else’s land, 
since almost everywhere in the  Pacific Islands, a change in land use or land rights is a 
contentious issue. A range of  case studies are presented in this paper, which between 
them invoke not only land issues, but six other factors which can underlie conflict 
(weak governance, economic inequality, food/ water insecurity, urbanisation, 
alienated youth and intergroup tension).   Further research would document many 
more examples, but the present brief survey clearly demonstrates the principle.  
 
A major factor determining whether such an increase in tension leads to violent 
conflict depends on how tense the situation was before the triggering event: will the 
trigger push the tension across a threshold of tolerance?   Alternatively in some 
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circumstances, the parties involved may perceive the potential damage from climate 
change as the greater  threat, and put aside their differences to work together to 
alleviate that shared threat.      
 
Are any of the case studies outlined here (or similar events in the next 10 years or so)  
likely to lead to violent conflict?  This requires a deeper analysis than we have been 
able to do at this stage, but our preliminary opinion is ‘no’. Perhaps the demographic 
time-bomb in Kiribati may lead to an increase in violent crime on Tarawa in the next 
ten years or so.  But sea level rise, though undoubtedly aggravating the underlying 
social dynamics of Kiribati, is unlikely to be dramatic enough over that short time 
frame to be a decisive trigger for conflict.  Barnett’s case studies in Tuvalu and Timor 
Leste lead him to a similar conclusion (Barnett, 2009).  Violence in the past decade in 
the Solomon Islands,  Fiji and Tonga and  continuing violence in Papua New Guinea 
have been  primarily driven by social or political factors other than climate change; 
climate change can only marginally affect those situations.  
 
In the longer term however,  unless the more industrialised countries (including China 
and USA) make a dramatic decrease in their greenhouse gas emissions,  sea level rise 
over the next 30 to 40 years is very likely to render Kiribati and other atoll nations 
uninhabitable. Relocating some 200,000 people from Pacific Islands will be traumatic 
for those people, especially if it occurs in a ‘last-minute’ rush but perhaps less so if 
larger neighbouring countries accept a gradual stream of emigrants.  In that way, 
conflict and tension in the accepting countries will also be minimised, as the ‘climate 
refugees’ would be only a small  proportion  of the immigration stream which they are 
currently accepting without much drama.  
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Table 1:    Summary of some Pacific examples illustrating how  disasters and/or climate 
change can lead to potential for conflict. In each case, a disaster event or manifestation of 
climate change triggers a ‘physical’ consequence, which in turn aggravates one of the socio-
economic factors which underpin conflict in the Pacific.  Some cases where conflict was 
successfully avoided are also listed.  The fisheries examples are not elaborated  in this paper, 
but are discussed in SPC (2008) and Weir & Virani (2010) . 
  
Trigger country (case) 
Physical 
consequence 
Socio-economic
factor(s)  
aggravated 
disaster  
(earthquake or 
volcano) 
SI (Gizo) 
 
 relocation of 
people affected
 Land; 
governance; 
economic 
inequality  
disaster  
(earthquake or 
volcano) 
PNG (Rabaul); 
Samoa (Savaii) 
 
 relocation of 
people affected
 None ! (see text)
sea level rise Kiribati; 
PNG (Cartarets)
 
low-lying atolls 
become 
unliveable -> 
relocation 
food/ water 
insecurity; land  
Climate change Solomon 
Islands; PNG, 
Kiribati; Fiji 
Decrease in 
rural food 
security -> 
increased 
migration to 
towns 
 
economic 
inequality; 
alienated youth; 
urbanisation 
Climate change Solomon 
Islands; 
 PNG; Kiribati; 
Fiji 
Offshore tuna 
fishery moves 
east 
 
economic 
inequality 
Climate change  All PICs  Coastal 
fisheries likely 
to decline 
 Food security; 
intergroup 
tension 
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NOTES 
 
 
[1] This paper is concerned with disaster events arising from natural hazards.  These 
were called ‘natural disasters’ in the terms of reference for the  consultancy on which 
this paper is based and in much of the older literature, but that term is now regarded 
by many as misleading and obsolete, on the grounds that  natural hazards become 
disasters only because of social and institutional factors.  
 
[2] These and other geographical  statistics in this paper come from SPC (2009).  
 
[3] The Equator runs through the middle of Figure 2 (near Nauru).  Therefore Pacific 
Islanders regard the terminology of ‘North’ for developed countries and ‘South’ for 
developing countries as geographically misleading and it is almost never used in this 
region. 
 
[4]  The disaster literature often distinguishes  ‘sudden onset’ disasters  where the 
damage occurs in a few days or even a few minutes, as with earthquakes and 
cyclones, from those like droughts where the damage is cumulative over years.   
 
[5] The term ‘refugee’ has dubious legal status in this context.  However, speaking of  
‘environmental refugees’ makes clear that they are people driven to relocate by 
clearly visible   environmental stresses, leaving open the vexed question of the degree 
to which these stresses can be attributed to climate change (Couldrey and Herson, 
2008).   
 
[6] The only island in Kiribati which rises more than 3 meters above sea level 
(Banaba) has no permanent fresh water,  and therefore does not offer a viable escape 
from rising sea levels.    
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